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Abstract
When defining monetary policy, emerging countries tend to protect their independent
monetary policy, by intervening in foreign exchange markets to stabilise the exchange rate
and by using capital controls to insulate their domestic economy from international invest-
ment fluctuations. In this scenario, currency volatility is dampened by official interventions
and so an index that reveals the actual pressure affecting a currency is necessary. This work
proposes an Exchange Market Pressure measure for the Brazilian economy, incorporating an
endogenous proxy for capital control policies. We find out that there is evidence of pressure
being relieved by the Brazilian central authorities and that the inclusion of a capital control
proxy in the measure inflates the power of reserves in relieving currency pressure.
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1 Introduction
Almost all over the world the national currencies are fiduciary. With no gold pattern, currencies
are in reality just like any other good that is traded in specified markets for a price: the
exchange rate. As a key economic variable, the exchange rate can be subject to government
control (via direct or indirect intervention) or it may be left to float freely, depending on several
circumstances.
This decision is part of the monetary policy definition, usually done by the Central Bank (CB).
Literature shows, however, that some policies regarding the exchange rate seem to conflict with
other monetary policy goals. Aizenman (2010) redefined the concept of impossible trinity, or
trilemma, applied to the the open economy set up. The author states that policy makers face a
trade-off when choosing two of three policy goals: exchange rate stability, independent monetary
policy and open capital markets. The idea is simple, if a Central Bank increases the reference
policy interest rate for a domestic reason (following an independent monetary policy), while in
an open capital market set up, capital flows tend to increase, leading to an appreciation of the
exchange rate.
In reality, most developing economies use, or have already used, monetary policy to sustain some
exchange rate goal, in order to stabilise the domestic economy and induce economic growth.
The literature supporting this policy decision is far from settled and this work aims precisely
into developing an additional information tool to support policy makers.
Brazil, as an emerging economy with relatively well developed financial markets is an interesting
case study in this set up. It pursues an independent monetary policy (targeting inflation), it
has a floating currency and is known to exert some controls over capital markets. The current
Brazilian currency, Real, was introduced in 1995 at par with the US dollar. In its early history,
as the credibility of the crawling peg to the US dollar was put in question, it faced strong
depreciation pressure, losing almost 75% of its value between 1997 and 2003. After 2005,
the exchange rate exhibited relative stability, mostly attributed to better macro-fundamentals,
deriving form the overall benefits of Lula da Silva’s governance1.
1Brazil has a presidential regime, in which the President it both the head of the state and of the government.
Lula da Silva was in office between 2003 and 2010.
1
A closer look into some macro-variables seems to point out that monetary policy also played an
important role. Foreign reserves increased exponentially since 2006, there was significant capital
flow volatility and several discretionary capital control measures were implemented, inverting
the capital liberalization trend observed between 1997 and 2006. So it would be interesting to
evaluate and quantify the impact of these policy measures in the value of the Brazilian currency.
Whenever a country has some sort of explicit or implicit goal over the exchange rate, the pressure
over a currency is not translated simply by changes in the exchange rates. For instance, if a
Central Bank is worried about a depreciating currency, it can ward off the pressure leading
to it by increasing official interest rates (indirect intervention) or buying domestic currency
in foreign exchange markets (direct intervention). A supplementary indirect tool to promote
exchange rate stability could be the establishment of capital controls.
Regardless of its type, whenever some intervention over the value of a currency is performed it
is desirable to have a measure of the pressure that is being relieved, either to provide further
knowledge in fighting currency crises or simply for Central Banks to have a better understanding
on how currency intervention can be done in a effective way.
The last empirical study about exchange market pressure in Brazil was done by Connolly &
Silveira (1979) and in this work we develop an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) for Brazil
based on more recent literature developments. The main goal is to understand if all or part
of the recent exchange rate stability was policy induced. We do so considering the traditional
direct intervention tools (the use of foreign reserves), but also including capital controls in the
measure. We draw back essentially from the model developed by Li (2012), that incorporated
a capital control parameter in Weymark’s (1995) measure.
We start by presenting some considerations about EMP indices and Capital Controls definitions
and their implications. Then we exhibit some stylized facts about the Brazilian economy,
fundamental to understand our approach to measure policy intervention in Real. The third
section presents the baseline model that will be used to build the EMP index. Finally, section
four presents the estimation method and the results, while section five concludes.
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2 Motivation
2.1 EMP and Capital Controls - Review of relevant literature
The concept was first presented by Girton & Roper (1977)2 in a seminal work that defined EMP
as a measure of the volume of intervention necessary to achieve a specified exchange rate target.
Weymark (1995) and Klassen & Jager (2011) further developed this definition in a model-free
way:
Definition 1. EMP measures the total excess supply for a currency in international markets
as the exchange rate change that would have been required to remove this excess supply in the
absence of forex market intervention, given the expectations generated by the exchange rate
policy already in place.
Intuitively, EMP can be viewed as an index that incorporates the wedge between a counterfac-
tual exchange rate3 and the observed exchange rate, that is:
EMPt = ∆et + e
c
t − et
Where et is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the domestic price of one unit of foreign
currency. The difference between the counterfactual exchange rate and the actual exchange
rate represents the portion of exchange rate volatility dampened by the CB through official
intervention. So a positive amount of pressure (depreciation) over a currency would be correctly
described by the actual depreciation of the currency (exchange rate change increase) plus the
amount of depreciation that the policy maker is avoiding.
This means that EMP might be computed based on:
EMPt = ∆et + ηixi (1)
Where xi stands for a vector of policy variables used by the central authority to intervene in
2This section details the milestones of EMP literature. A more comprehensive description is provided in
Annex 1
3The counterfactual here is the one of a passive policy maker, which would have no exchange rate goals when
designing monetary policy.
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the forex market and ηi represents the efficiency of a specific policy. Different studies consider
different policy variables, but changes in foreign reserves and changes in the interest policy rate
are two common examples.
Naturally, there are several other policy actions that could be used to affect the exchange
rate. The financial crises of 2008 brought up the discussion over capital controls again. Several
studies try to contribute to a policy making process that includes some sort of financial openness
restriction to insulate domestic economies from international crisis.
According to IMF, capital controls “encompass regulations that influence capital flows and
include various measures that regulate the conclusion of execution of transactions and transfers
and the holding of assets in the country by non-residents and abroad by residents”4. Such
regulations are broad and are commonly used, mainly in times of financial distress. However,
current literature does not provide definite conclusions about the impacts of capital flows or
about the effectiveness of any measures to regulate them.
Capital inflows occur when foreign investors perceive that the rate of return of a particular
potential receiving country is higher than the international rate of return, reflecting any risk
considerations that might exist. Capital flows are broadly classified as foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), portfolio investment and also on a residual category including all non-tradable
instruments.
The expected effects and risks of capital inflows vary according to the actual type of inflow
occurring. FDI, for instance, is assumed to be a stabilising factor during crises in emerging
markets, due to its more permanent effect and highest degree of risk sharing between the
receiver and the investor. Short-term external debt and stock purchases are, on the other hand,
perceived as much riskier because they can be easily reversed. The effects also vary according
to the receiving country specificities5. Theory argues that for most industrial countries capital
flows are largely beneficial, while for developing and emerging countries the benefits must be
weighed with some important risks (like the volatility of flows, the increase of exposure to
international shocks or the reduction of the scope of domestic policy instruments).
4Source: IMF - AREAER (2012)
5Capital flows determinants are generally classified as pull or push factors. While pull factors represent the
country-specific determinants (like high domestic interest rates), push factors are generally common exogenous
determinants (like international crises).
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This short discussion aims only to provide some insight about the motivation of the numerous
studies that try establish formal correlations between capital flows and economic or financial
variables. For this work, the most important correlations are the ones regarding any effects
over the exchange rate. Aside from indirect effects, the simple fact that capital flows imply
economic transactions between countries with different currencies must influence the demand
and the supply with corresponding effects on the relative prices of currencies. Those are some of
the effects that policy makers may wish deal with using official intervention, like the imposition
of capital controls.
Incorporating capital controls in the EMP measure would allow us to to expand clearly its
scope providing policy markers with an additional layer of information. This incorporation
is not straightforward, as it raises a problem of measure on the intensity of capital controls.
Common capital control measures are related with tax legislation (to reduce short-term and
promote long-term inflows), limits on offshore borrowing, taxes on financial transactions or
even the legal prohibition of some kinds of capital transactions. With such possible broadness
in instruments any numerical measure is hard to compute.
Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2013) developed the Trilemma index which aims at providing a
numerical measure of the baseline monetary policy components: a measure of monetary inde-
pendence based on the correlation of the domestic and the the foreign interest rate, a measure
of exchange rate stability, based on exchange rate volatility (to assess the flexibility of the ex-
change rate) and a financial openness index, based on capital flows restrictions. The later is the
one that matters the most for this work.
The index of financial openness (or Chinn-Ito Index) measures the extent of capital liberalization
using binary dummy variables that mimic the specification of capital account restriction in IMF’s
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This index
has, by construction, mean zero and its interpretation is based on the deviation to that mean.
A country with high degree of financial openness, within the sample, is assigned a positive
value, while the converse occurs for the countries with low degree of financial openness, with
negative figures. Despite informative, such index has an important drawback: a specific value
has little intrinsic meaning. As it depends on the distribution of the sample, so this index is
not suitable to be directly incorporated in an EMP measure. Such incorporation would mean
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that the economic interpretation of EMP would be linked to the relative position of a country
in the distribution, providing no stand alone information. Even so, for comparative purposes
(relative to the sample and across time) the index for Brazil will be reported in Annex 2.
Our EMP measure can be seen as a development of Li (2012), where the index is set in a way
that the role of capital controls can be included. Using a small open economy monetary model
in the spirit of Weymark(1995), the author introduced a wedge in the uncovered interest parity
condition (UIP) to illustrate the evolution of capital controls. In this context, the multiplicative
time-varying parameter added to UIP represents the risk premium between domestic and foreign
investment. The underlying assumption is that the risk premium can adequately summarize
capital mobility rigidities, generated by the capital controls policy. This innovation enters the
measure as part of the weighting factor of foreign reserves (the only policy instrument considered
by the author) yielding the following measure:
EMPt = ∆et − (a2 − b2λt)−1∆rt (2)
Where ∆rt are the log changes in foreign reserves. The difference from Weymark (1995) measure
is specifically the inclusion of λt, that enters the measure jointly with b2, the semi-elasticity
of money demand to changes in interest rates. The author chooses to proxy this variable
exogenously, using the Chinn-Ito Capital Controls Index referred above. The author applies its
measure to the Chinese economy to evaluate whether the inclusion of capital controls is evidence
of over or under estimation of the Weymark measure of EMP, that neglects it.
In this work we contribute to EMP theory by estimating an endogenous proxy of capital controls,
nested in a general monetary model, used to evaluate the exchange market pressure in Brazil
between 2002 and 2014. More details about this proxy and its inclusion on the EMP measure
are presented in section three.
2.2 The case of Brazil
Brazil is a very important emerging economy and has some economic and monetary character-
istics that make it a very interesting case study for the measure proposed in this work. In this
section we present some relevant stylized facts about the economy.
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Brazil has had a tumultuous currency history. Since the 1940’s Brazil has known four currencies
as a result of very high depreciation pressure, fuelled by chronically high inflation6. To stabilize
inflation, Banco Central do Brasil pursued a very active inflation stabilization policy, mainly
based on the maintenance of a very high reference interest rate until 1994 (interest rates were
sometimes well above 1000%).
The turnaround happened in 1995 with the Plano Real that was implemented to perform an
adjustment of fiscal accounts, followed by a monetary reform, leading to the introduction of
the actual currency: Brazilian Real.7 This currency started as a crawling peg to the US dollar,
suffered from high inflation between February 1999 and September 1999, when it was classified
as a freely falling currency, but has stabilized since then, evolving into a managed float and
finally a floating currency, according to Iltzetzki, Reinhart & Rogoff (2011).
Real has undoubtedly been a more stable currency (specially when comparing with the previous
Brazilian currencies), Figure 1 shows the quarterly evolution of the nominal exchange rate of
the currency per unit of US dollar as well as a fine classification of the exchange rate regimes8.
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Figure 1: BRL to USD Exchange Rate
6As in other South American countries, inflation has been a very significant problem for economic development
and stability on Brazil, with figures of more than 6000% in annualized terms in the beginning of 1990, for instance.
7For more details about the brazilian currency history and Plano Real see Frenkel & Rapetti (2010), for
instance.
8Ilzetzki, et al. (2011) differs from official IMF classification between 1999 and 2010. According to IMF,
Brazilian Real is a floating currency since 1999, however many studies classify the currency as a dirty or managed
float.
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The crawling peg regime is clear in the first years, after which there was a significant trend of
currency depreciation that was inverted in 2003 and led to a period of relative exchange rate
stability. Since 1995, Real faced four currency crises9: in 1999 due to the speculative pressure
put over the credibility of the peg to the US dollar, in 2001 and 2002 associated with the
domestic presidential elections, the Argentine debt crisis and the 09.11 on the US and finally in
2008 after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers’. Since 2005 the exchange rate floated between a
band of 1.5 and 2.5, relative to USD, showing a relative stability never seen in Brazil’s currency
history. This is precisely the period in which this work focuses its attention: was this stability
only due to better macro fundamentals or was it policy induced?
To assess if in fact some central authority action was taken to induce this stability we should
look at the evolution of some relevant macroeconomic variables. Figure 2 gives a bird eye view
of some relevant variables for our analysis.
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Figure 2: Collection of relevant macro-variables for Brazil
The money market interest rate, here presented as a proxy10 for a short term interest rate, and
inflation are presented in the first graph. The policy rate is tightly controlled by the CB in an
inflation targeting monetary policy set up - the strong correlation between the two variables
is clear in the graph. Despite the high volatilities in the beginning of the sample, since 2008
9Currency crises are defined as a period in which annual depreciation versus a relevant foreign currency (the
US dollar) was 15% or higher, according to Reinhart & Rogoff (2009). For comparative purposes, the same study
pinpoints 37 episodes of crisis between 1940 and 1995, which equates approximately to a share of 66% years in
currency crisis, compared to 27% between 1996 and 2010.
10Brazil does not issue short term bonds with frequency and so most studies typically use the CB reference
rate -SELIC.
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both inflation and the interest rate seem to have stabilized around 6 % and 10%, respectively.
These figures are in line with the idea of greater monetary stability brought to the country by
Plano Real11. Even so, it is relevant to note that this reference interest rate is significantly
high, particularly when compared with other inflation-targeting policy induced rates.
The graph on the right shows the evolution of foreign reserves, exhibiting a clearly upward trend
since 2006. The significant increase in foreign reserves was observed not only in Brazil, but also
in several emerging countries. Publicly, the Central Banks of these countries argue that such
sharp increase has nothing to do with exchange rate goals and aims only at avoiding liquidity
problems deriving from international crises. Recent research on this common upward trend,
on the other hand, defends that the the goals of such reserve accumulation are far beyond the
protection against liquidity problems.
When computing an exchange market pressure measure, as proposed in equation (1), a set of
policy variables must be selected. Literature provides several examples, but the most broadly
used policy variables are foreign reserve changes and short term interest rates. At this point,
it seems reasonable to assess if both of these policy variables are a desirable inclusion in the
measure developed for Brazil.
To infer a possible relationship between foreign reserves and the exchange rate we can analyse
the lagged changes in foreign reserves held by the Central Bank as well as the change in the
exchange rate:
11Reinhart & Rogoff, in their 2009 study, also provide information about inflation crises, defined as years when
inflation was higher or equal to 20%. For Brazil, the share of years under inflation crisis is around 68% between
1940 and 1995 (38 episodes over 56 years), while no inflation crisis occurred between 1996 and 2010.
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Figure 3: Log change in Exchange Rate and Foreign Reserves
The strong negative relationship between changes in the exchange rates and in foreign reserves
is generically clear all over the sample, meaning that they are probably used to influence the
exchange rate, even past the managed float period (Q1 2011). Such relation makes it an adequate
variable to include in out measure.
An interest rate component, however, may not be an adequate inclusion in this particular model,
once most changes in the short term interest rate are directed to inflation control. Moreover, as
the interest rate is relatively high, including it as a policy variable for this matter could inflate
the EMP measure, specially because there is no effective way of isolating interest rate changes
that target the exchange rate rather than the inflation rate.
To complete this preliminary analysis we must evaluate the stance of Brazil regarding capital
flows and capital controls. Brazil as most emerging economies is known to pursue protectionist
policies, both by restricting international trade and by posing significant controls on the capital
account to protect domestic economy. To do so, a natural first step is to analyse the composition
of the financial account and the current account of Brazil:
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Figure 4: Current Account and Financial Account balances and composition.
Between 2003 and 2007 the current account was positive, mainly due to the figures of the goods
and services components. After the domestic crisis associated with the presidential elections
and the contagion from the Argentine crisis, the economy started to grow steadily12, supported
by accelerating exports and imports, generating positive trade balances. The international
financial crisis of 2008 had a significant impact on growth and on net exports, leading to a
strong and increasing current account deficit in the last years of the sample, due to increasing
negative figures in net exports13.
On the Financial Account side, it is clear that Brazil was a net lender between 2003 and
2006, receiving little net foreign investment. As stated before, the improving performance of
the economy (and the high interest rates in Brazil) contributed to the significant increase of
capital flows in 2007 (particularly portfolio investment). This inflow was suddenly reversed in
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, leading to a major currency depreciation. From 2009 on, there
was a very significant increase in capital inflows. Up to 2010 portfolio investment (much more
volatile) dominated and from that point on there was a steady increase of direct investment
(generally harder to reverse). Additionally, it is relevant to stress that 2008 is the only year
with no significant increase in net foreign reserves between 2006 and 2011. This fact is certainly
associated with the depreciation hike in 2008, to which the CB reacted by reducing foreign
reserve holdings.14
12Average GDP growth was 4% in this period, according to the World Bank Statistics.
13Several studies, like Costa & Sbardellati (2012) show that the composition of Brazilian exports shifted
substantially during the 2000s. Non-manufactured products represent the highest share of Brazilian exports
after 2009. This fact is commonly associated with the appreciation of the currency and loss of international
competitiveness.
14Quarterly data shows net accumulation of reserves in Q1 to Q3 of 2008, followed by a very steep net reduction
in Q4 (-20 billions USD).
11
The strong capital inflow reversal in 2008 and the capital flows that flooded Brazil from 2009 on
re-ignited the panic about capital flow volatility in the country. As a result, Brazil implemented
several capital control measures between 2009 and 2012. The most common measure was the
manipulation of a Financial Operations Transaction Tax (IOF acronym in Portuguese), to
amplify the wedge between domestic and foreign investment. A short description of the main
capital control’s measures, for the sample period, is presented in the following table:
Loosen Limits	on	FDI	by	nonfinancial	private	companies	lifted.	
Loosen CB	approval	on	some	personal	capital	transactions	was	lifted.
Sep.	2006 Loosen Controls	on	transfers	abroad	abolished.
Oct.	2009 Tighten IOF	tax	rate	of	2%	on		equity	and	fixed-income	PI,	for	non-residents.
Tighten Increase	of	IOF	tax	to	4%	(fixed-income	PI	and	equity	funds).
Tighten Increase	of	IOF	tax	to	6%	on	fixed-income	investment.
Tighten Regulations	on	shifting	investment	from	equity	to	fixed-income.
Jan.	2011 Tighten Non-interest	reserve	requirement	of	60%	of	bank's	short	dollar	positions	in	Forex	Spot	Market.
Mar.	2011 Tighten Increase	of	IOF	tax	to	6%	on	new	foreign	loans	with	maturities	up	to	a	year.
Apr.	2011 Tighten 6%	IOF	tax	extendend	to	new	and	renewed	foreign	loans	with	maturities	up	to	2	years.
Dec.	2011 Loosen IOF	on	equity	and	fixed	income	linked	with	infrastructure	projects	is	eliminated.
Tighten 6%	IOF	extended	for	foreign	loans	with	maturities	up	to	5	years.
Tighten Export	advanced	payment	transactions	with	maturities	of	more	than	a	year	prohibited.
Jun.	2012 Loosen 6%	IOF	restricted	to	new	and	renewed	foreign	loans	with	maturities	up	to	two	years.
Dec.	2012 Loosen 6%	IOF	restricted	to	new	and	renewed	foreign	loans	with	maturities	up	to	a	year.
Jun.	2013	 Loosen Tax	on	fixed-income	flows	eliminated.
Oct.	2010
Source:	Adapted	from	Prates	&	Fritz	(2013)	and	Baba	&	Kokenyne	(2011)
Major	Capital	Control	Policies	&	Regulations,	in	sample	period
Mar.	2012	
Mar.	2005	
Table 1: Main Capital Control measures
This short analysis shows that Brazil is an interesting case study for our Exchange Market
Pressure set up. First, it recently experienced relative exchange rate stability, in the context
of a managed float regime and a float regime (starting in 2011). This stability is certainly
related with better fundamentals, but the behaviour of some policy variables may signal that
some relevant policy intervention occurred in this period. Clearly, the exponential increase in
foreign reserves, since 2006, may be related with some exchange rate goals, either to prevent
appreciation or mitigate depreciation pressure. Finally, there was a clear inversion of the capital
liberalization trend started in the 1990s. The huge capital inflows from 2009 on brought new
capital control measures, used to insulate domestic economic from capital volatility. In this
context, an EMP measure including foreign reserves as a policy measures and reflecting the
capital openness stance may provide relevant additional information.
As referred above, the span of the analysis is between the Q1 2002 until Q4 2014, in order to
include three benchmark periods. First, between 2002 and 2007, when in the aftermath of a
12
turmoiled period there is economic expansion, in a capital liberalization environment associated
with currency appreciation. This growth path is interrupted by the financial crisis of 2008,
leading to a second period, between 2008 and 2012. This phase is characterised by a sudden
depreciation and a re-appreciation of the currency, mainly due to the massive capital inflows
between 2009 and mid-2012, where capital controls were used. The final period, between mid-
2012 and 2014, is a period of economic slowdown, in which capital flows seem to stabilize, capital
controls are relaxed and intervention in forex market is lower.
3 Model
As referred above, in this work a typical monetary model of a small open economy will be used
to derive the EMP measure, given the following assumptions:
• purchasing power parity (PPP) does not necessarily hold;
• domestic output and the foreign price level are exogenous;
• market participants observe only contemporaneous exchange and interest rates;
• well developed financial markets;
• domestic and foreign assets may not be perfect substitutes (uncovered interest parity
(UIP) holds exactly only when λt = 1);
– λt works as a proxy of capital controls, based on the wedge in the UIP being inter-
preted as summing up capital control restrictions;
• domestic residents hold domestic currency for transaction purposes and hold speculative
balances of foreign claims.
This model is described by the following conditions:
mdt = b0,t + pt + b1,tyt + b2,tit + vt (3)
pt = a0,t + p
∗
t + a1,tet (4)
it − i∗t = λt (E[et+1|t]− et) (5)
mst = m
s
t−1 + ∆dt + ∆rt (6)
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∆rt = −ρt∆et (7)
The first equation is a standard money demand condition, where domestic demand for money
depends on a time-varying intercept, the domestic price level (pt), the exogenous output (yt) and
the interest rate (it), as well as on a random shock (vt). Domestic price level evolves according
to the second condition, depending on the foreign price level (p∗t ) and the exchange rate (et).
This condition reduces to PPP if a0,t = 0 and a1,t = 1.
The third equation links domestic (it) and foreign (i
∗
t ) interests rates through the differential
between the expected (E[et+1|t]) and the actual (et) exchange rates, weighted by λt. This
time-varying parameter works as a capital control index in the sense that it drives a wedge
between perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, deviating from a perfect
UIP condition whenever λt 6= 1. In normal circumstances we would expect λt to be positive,
once expected depreciation of the currency (increase in the exchange rate gap), should lead
to an increase in the interest rate gap (due to an increase of the domestical interest rate) to
provide adequate incentive to foreign investment in the country. A negative value would be
counterintuitive. However, such figures could mean the expectation system was particularly
distorted, like in the event of severe unexpected shocks hitting the economy.
The fourth condition states, as usual, that changes in money supply are the result of changes
in domestic credit (∆dt) and in foreign currency reserves (∆rt).
We assume that the changes in reserves occur only as a response to changes in the exchange rate,
so the last equation is the behavioural condition explaining the evolution of foreign exchange
reserves. In this sense, ρt works as a time-varying CB policy response parameter
15. Note that:
• If ρt = 0 the reserves of the CB don’t change in response to changes in the exchange rate,
so the CB allows et to float freely;
• If ρt =∞ the CB imposes a fixed exchange rate regimes by compensating any change in
the exchange rate with a change in reserves;
• If 0 < ρt <∞ the CB runs an intermediate exchange rate regime.
15We report the time evolution of ρ for the sample period in Brazil in Annex 3. Negative values for ρ would
mean reserves were varying directly with the exchange rate, signalling either movements that are not due to
exchange rate goals or procyclical use of reserves.
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The negative sign in this response function is intuitive: if ∆et is positive the currency is depre-
ciating, so the response of foreign reserves must be of the opposite sign. The CB must decrease
international reserves by selling foreign reserves and buying domestic currency in forex markets.
Substituting (4) and (5) in (3) yields the money demand function specification:
mdt = a0,t + b0,t + p
∗
t + (a1,t − b2,tλt)et + b1,tyt + b2,ti∗t + b2,tλtE[et+1|t] + vt
Therefore, changes in the money demand can be defined as:
∆mdt ≡mdt −mdt−1
⇔ ∆mdt =α0,t + ∆p∗t + (a1,t − b2,tλt)∆et + ∆(a1,t − b2,tλt)et−1 + b1,t∆yt + ∆b1,tyt−1+
+ b2,t∆i
∗
t + ∆b2,ti
∗
t−1 + b2,tλt∆E[et+1|t] + ∆(b2,tλt)E[et|t− 1] + ∆vt
where α0,t = (a0,t + b0,t) − (a0,t−1 + b0,t−1). Now, assuming that the money market clears
continuously, so that mt = m
d
t = m
s
t and using (7), we can derive the money market equilibrium
as:
∆mst =∆dt + ∆rt = ∆m
d
t
(7)⇔ ∆dt − ρt∆et =α0,t + ∆p∗t + (a1,t − b2,tλt)∆et + ∆(a1,t − b2,tλt)et−1 + b1,t∆yt + ∆b1,tyt−1+
+ b2,t∆i
∗
t + ∆b2,ti
∗
t−1 + b2,tλt∆E[et+1|t] + ∆(b2,tλt)E[et|t− 1] + ∆vt
Solving for ∆et yields:
−(a1,t − b2,tλt)∆et − ρt∆et =Xt
∆et =− 1
a1,t − b2,tλt + ρtXt (8)
where Xt = α0,t + ∆p
∗
t + ∆(a1,t − b2,tλt)et−1 + b1,t∆yt + ∆b1,tyt−1 + b2,t∆i∗t + ∆b2,ti∗t−1 +
b2,tλt∆E[et+1|t] + ∆(b2,tλt)E[et|t− 1] + ∆vt −∆dt.
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Using the general definition and the measure of EMP proposed by Weymark (1995), the EMP
index can be calculated from:
EMPt = ∆et + ηt∆rt
As shown above, ηt is a conversion coefficient that aims at converting ∆rt into the corresponding
comparable ∆et units. This coefficient can be obtained from (8), considering that ∆rt = −ρt∆et:
−(a1,t − b2,tλt)∆et − ρt∆et = Xt
⇔ −(a1,t − b2,tλt)∆et + ∆rt = Xt
⇔ ∆et = − 1
(a1,t − b2,tλt) [Xt −∆rt] (9)
According to Weymark ηt corresponds to the symmetric of the marginal effects that changes in
reserves have on changes in the exchange rate:
ηt = −d∆et
d∆rt
= −
[
∂∆et
∂Xt
· dXt
d∆rt
+
∂∆et
∂∆rt
· d∆rt
d∆rt
]
The channels through which reserves can affect the exchange rates are represented by the
derivatives in the last equality. First, there is an effect indirect effect: whenever changes in
reserves affect other variables, that in turn affect exchange rate changes. The second effect is
a direct one, that is nay impact that changes in reserves have directly over the changes in the
exchange rates. Given the model specification assumed above, the effect of changes in reserves
in any variable contained in Xt is equal to zero, hence:
ηt = −
[
∂∆et
∂Xt
· 0 + ∂∆et
∂∆rt
· d∆rt
d∆rt
]
= − 1
a1,t − b2,tλt = −ωt (10)
Where ωt is the sensitivity of changes in the exchange rate with respect to changes in the
reserves, and ηt is this elasticity associated with a negative sign deriving from the definition of
EMP. The associated index is given by:
EMPt = ∆et − 1
a1,t − b2,tλt∆rt (11)
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Which depends positively on the changes in the exchange rates and negatively on the changes
in foreign reserves. The reserves’ component enters the measure with a model specific weight,
depending on:
• a1,t, the parameter that measures the sensitivity of domestic price level to the exchange
rate (from equation (3));
• b2,t, the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand (from equation (2));
• λt, the capital control proxy.
Naturally to compute the measure suggested these coefficients must be estimated for any econ-
omy one wishes to study.
From a purely numeric perspective a comparison of the index derived here and the one obtained
by Weymark is straightforward. Recalling that Weymark (1995) index is given by:
EMPWt = ∆et −
1
a1,t − b2,t∆rt (12)
it is easy to observe that the presence of the capital control index will imply an over or under
estimation of EMPWt , whenever λt 6= 1.
4 Estimation Results
The EMP measure proposed in Section 3 requires that some structural parameters are estimated.
Recall equation (11), to compute it we need to estimate a1,t, b2,t and λt. These estimates will
be derived from the following equations:
mdt − pt = b0,t + b1,tyt + b2,tit + vt (money condition)
pt − p∗t = a0,t + a1,tet + ut (pricing condition)
it − i∗t = λt (E[et+1|t]− et) + wt (interest rate condition)
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In this work the structural parameter estimation is done using the Time-Varying Coefficient
method (TVC)16, following Hall, Kenjegaliev, Swamy & Tavlas (2013).
Previous model dependent studies on EMP measures have used two-stage least squares methods
to compute structural parameters, in order to account for simultaneity and endogeneity issues.
However, such estimators may be inconsistent once the model specification may yield incorrect
functional forms and neglect important explanatory variables. Hall et al. (2013) used the TVC
method to estimate model dependent coefficients incorporated in their EMP measure. Moreover,
to understand changes in policy responses over a large time span, time varying parameters could
provide additional relevant information.
According to Swamy and Mehta (1975) and Granger (2008), any nonlinear functional form
can be exactly represented by a linear model, if the coefficients of the explanatory variables
are allowed to vary across time. Therefore, by allowing time variability of coefficients any
relationship between a dependent and some independent variables can be estimated in a linear
way, even if the correct functional form is unknown. Based on this theorem, and with a complete
set of explanatory variables (with no measurement error), consistent estimates of the true partial
derivatives of the explained variable with respect to the regressors can be obtained with a TVC
method. However, if the set of independent variables is not complete (and it is likely not to be
in any parsimonious model) or any measurement error is present the estimates become biased.
The TVC method proposed by Swamy, Tavlas, Hall & Hondroyiannis (2010) can then be used
to decompose the estimates, by identifying the bias part that can be subtracted to the total
estimates to yield an unbiased and consistent estimator.
According to the authors, the use of this method implies two parametric assumptions. First,
TVCs are assumed to be determined by stochatic equations, so they are functions of some
exogenous regressors (defined as coefficient-drivers). Additionally, so that the relationship can
be represented by TVCs and the decomposition between the biased and the unbiased part can
occur, some of these drivers are considered to be correlated with the time variation of the
non-linear functional form and others with the misspecification biases (omitted variables and
measurement errors).
16In a state space model set up, in Eviews.
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The cumbersome part of this procedure is precisely the choice of the coefficient-drivers. Hall,
Swamy & Tavlas (2014) provided some guidelines to the selection and split of this variables
into two subsets, so that the coefficient decomposition is possible. Broadly, the set of drivers
should be related with predictive power and relevance. Increasing the predictive power could be
guaranteed by including a large set of coefficient drivers, however for relevance purposes drivers
coefficients should also be significantly different from zero. Predictive power can be assessed
with an analogue17 of the conventional R2, while relevance can be evaluated by standard t-tests,
as the full TVC method produces a covariance matrix for all the driver’s estimated coefficients.
With a set of drivers defined, the spilt of these variables in two sets should be done according to
the correlation with the unbiased coefficient and the drivers correlated with the misspecification.
In practical terms, some drivers should be explicitly selected to capture the nonlinearity, while
all the others are assumed to be correlated with the misspecification, which leads to the bias of
the structural parameters estimation.
In the following section we present and interpret the results of the parameter estimation, as
well the EMP measures resulting from it. All the data is obtained from the IMF-IFS database,
the exception are two series: the exchange rate expectations obtained from Banco Central do
Brasil and EMBI+ from IBGE18.
4.1 Coefficient estimates
To get a better understanding about the relationship between the variables expressed in the
conditions referred we first estimate the benchmark relationship using OLS both in levels and
in first differences. The results are presented in the tables below.
17R˜2 = 1−
∑
t(εt−ε¯)2∑
t(yt−y¯)2
, where εt are the residuals and yt the explanatory variable.
18Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica
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Interest	Condition Money	Condition Price		Condition
Coefficients 0,1201*** 0,0706 Coefficients -10,5402*** 1,2991*** -2,6544*** Coefficients 0,1797*** -0,2994***
Standard	Errors	 0,0062 0,1047 Standard	Errors	 2,9719 0,0460 0,3664 Standard	Errors	 0,0589 0,0724
Adjusted	R-squared Adjusted	R-squared Adjusted	R-squared
Interest	Condition Money	Condition Price		Condition
Coefficients -0,0012 0,0171 Coefficients 0,0135*** 0,8805*** -0,1214 Coefficients 0,0099*** 0,0562***
Standard	Errors	 0,0022 0,0317 Standard	Errors	 0,0035 0,0441 0,2490 Standard	Errors	 0,0015 0,0186
Adjusted	R-squared Adjusted	R-squared Adjusted	R-squared
Equation:
0,9426
Equation:
0,8947
A.	OLS	estimates	in	levels
B.	OLS	estimates	in	first	differences
Equation:
-0,0108
-0,0144
Equation:
0,2399
Equation:
0,1372
Equation:
𝝀𝟎 𝝀𝟏
(𝑖&−𝑖&∗) = 𝜆, +𝜆. 𝐸(𝑒&1.|𝑒& − 𝑒& + 𝜀&	
𝝀𝟎 𝝀𝟏
∆(𝑖& − 𝑖&∗) = 𝜆, + 𝜆.∆ 𝐸(𝑒&1.|𝑒& − 𝑒& + 𝜀&	
𝒃𝟎 𝒃𝟏
(𝑚&−𝑝&) = 𝑏, + 𝑏.𝑦& + 𝑏;𝑖& 	+	𝜀&	
𝒃𝟐
𝒃𝟎 𝒃𝟏
∆(𝑚& −𝑝&) = 𝑏, + 𝑏.∆𝑦& +𝑏;∆𝑖& 	+	𝜀&	
𝒃𝟐
𝒂𝟎 𝒂𝟏
(𝑝&− 𝑝&∗) = 𝑎, + 𝑎.𝑒&+ 	𝜀&	
𝒂𝟎 𝒂𝟏
∆(𝑝&− 𝑝&∗) = 𝑎, + 𝑎.∆𝑒& +	𝜀&	
Table 2: OLS estimates: (A) in levels (B) in first differences
Panel A presents the results of the baseline OLS regression in levels. For the money equation,
the estimates have the expected sign. There is a positive relationship between output and the
deflated money demand and a negative and strong relationship between the short term interest
rate and the deflated money demand. The adjusted R2 is near one, however this could be the
result of a spurious regression due to the usual nonstarionarity issues. In the price equation
the results are less robust: the exchange rate coefficient does not have the expected sign and
the adjusted R2 is relatively low. This suggests that the gap between domestic price level and
foreign price level (here proxied by US CPI) cannot be satisfactorily explained by changes in
the price of the Brazilian currency relative to the US dollar. The interest condition, that links
the interest rate gap19 and the exchange rate gap (between the expected exchange rate20, at
t+ 1, and the current observed exchange rate, at t), shows that the effect of the exchange rate
gap is small and not statistically significant. Moreover, the explanatory power of the exchange
rate gap seems to be small, suggesting that other variables should be included to explain the
interest rate gap. Panel B present the results for the same equations when all the variables are
in first differences, generically the relationships are weaker than in levels (lower explanatory
power, smaller coefficients and lower statistical significance).
Our next step is to use the TVC approach to estimate the same elasticities. The estimation
results presented in Table 3 were obtained using a set of coefficient drivers to estimate three
signal equations based on seven state equations, the actual equations are presented in Annex 4.
19Between Brazil’s short term interest rate and the US 3-month Treasury Bill.
20Here referring to the exchange rate expectation of the following quarter, based on the information available
in the first days of the previous three months, forecasted by Banco Central do Brasil.
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As state in the previous section, the selection of the coefficient drivers aims at capturing both
non-linearities of the functional form and biases arising from omitted variables. In general
terms, to capture non-linearities we include in each state equation the regressor for which we
are trying to compute the TVC, in such specification that term reflects a simple non-linearity
(quadratic) in the functional form, as proposed by Swamy et al. (2014). To capture bias
from omitted variables we use an extensive set of variables21: exports and import values, net
exports, an EMBI+ index of risk for Brazil22, the index of industrial production, the BOVESPA
index (Stock index of Sa˜o Paulo), inflation, terms of trade index and nominal and real effective
exchange rates. The selection of these variables is made by evaluating its statistical significance
in each equation.23 The final variables included in each equation are also presented in Annex 4.
After estimating what we call the total effect of the variable, we must split the coefficients
into the unbiased and the biased part, once only the unbiased part represents the true partial
derivative of a given dependent variable with respect to a specific regressor. Following Hallet al.
(2014), the decomposition is clear: to get the unbiased estimate we need to subtract to the total
coefficient the effect from the omitted variables, as well as the error term of the respective state
equation. This decomposition is only done for the elasticities that matter for EMP calculation
(a1,t, b2,t and λ1,t), that are highlighted in bold in the following table.
Interest	Condition Money	Condition Price		Condition
Coefficients	Av. 0,1139*** -0,0396*** Coefficients	Av. 4,0403*** 0,73336*** -2,4673*** Coefficients	Av. -0,0393*** 0,2505***
Root	MSE 0,0111 NA Root	MSE 0,0000 0,0021 0,0984 Root	MSE 0,0078 0,0111
Coefficients	Av. - 0,6318 Coefficients	Av. - - -1,1879 Coefficients - 1,0019
R-squared	analog - 0,1501 R-squared	analog - - 0,4358 R-squared	analog - 0,8280
Bias-free	effects
Total	effects
Bias-free	effects
TVC	estimates	period	averages
Equation: Equation: Equation:
Total	effectsTotal	effects
Bias-free	effects
𝝀𝟎 𝝀𝟏
(𝑖&−𝑖&∗) = 𝜆, +𝜆. 𝐸(𝑒&1.|𝑒& − 𝑒& + 𝜀&	
𝒃𝟎 𝒃𝟏
(𝑚&−𝑝&) = 𝑏, + 𝑏.𝑦& +𝑏:𝑖& 	+	𝜀&	
𝒃𝟐 𝒂𝟎 𝒂𝟏
(𝑝&− 𝑝&∗) = 𝑎, + 𝑎.𝑒&+ 	𝜀&	
Table 3: Time Varying Coefficients estimates, sample averages.
For the money and the price conditions, all the coefficients have the expected sign, both in
21In levels and changes, for both contemporaneous and lagged values. Nominal values were converted to real
values when appropriate and seasonal adjustments were performed using Eviews toolkit.
22The Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) is constructed by JPMorgan to assess the risk of investing in
emerging economies, namely Brazil, on a daily basis. The idea is to proxy a risk measure for countries that don’t
issue debt in a regular manner, by evaluating the spread of the return on a portfolio of external debt instruments
(foreign currency denominated fixed-income) in a country versus the comparable return for investment in risk-free
assets (generally US bonds).
23We estimate the model with all the variables, in all equations, in a first step. Then the model is estimated
again only with the statistical significant variables, with the exception of the intersepts that are kept even if the
not significant.
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terms of total and bias-free effects. The relevant bias-free estimates are, on average, -1.19 (b2)
and 1.00 (a1). Regarding the interest condition and the capital control proxy, the total effect
is significant, but weak. Besides it is negative which, as discussed before, is not the expected
sign. The bias-free estimate, on the other hand, is positive and quite different from 1 (0.63),
indicating that capital controls were present across the sample24.
The average conversion factor, ωt as defined in equation (10), for the EMP measure based on
these estimates is:
With	Capital	
Controls
Without	Capital	
Controls
TVC	Average	(Unb) 0,5706 0,4567
Table 4: Conversion factors
The conversion factors are relatively small, but have the expected sign (ωt is expected to be
positive, so that ηt is negative). Actually, the average conversion factor is relatively higher due
to the inclusion of the capital controls parameter, which might indicate that capital controls
could inflate the power of the foreign reserves in affecting the exchange rate.
To close this section we present the time-varying unbiased estimates of the elasticities used to
compute the time-varying EMP measure that we present in the next section:
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Figure 5: Time-Varying Coefficients: a2,t and b2,t
The graph on the left shows that the relation between the price gap and the exchange rate is
24Recall that we assumed that if no capital controls existed, then the uncovered interest parity holds and λ = 1
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steadily positive as theory suggests, the time variation shows a downward trend (only interrupted
by the crises of 2002/2003 and 2008), that we may associate with the steady decline of the
inflation rate in Brazil (following the interest rate stabilization observed in this period). The
elasticity of the money demand with the interest rate, on the right, is increasingly negative
across all the sample, as we could expect in an economy with a well developed financial system,
in which the interest rate is substantially high due to inflation targeting goals.
Finally, the uncovered interest parity imbalance (the proxy for capital controls) shows very high
volatility, as shown below by the blue line.
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Figure 6: Time-Varying capital control proxy and discretionary capital flow regulations.
The peaks are associated with periods of very steep depreciation or appreciation pressure. In
such periods, the process of generating expectations may be weakened due to unantecipated
shocks hitting the economy. As discussed in section 2.2, in 2002 and 2008 the economy was
affected by the most significant crises in the sample period. Overall, our endogenous measure
of capital controls captures relatively well the time evolution of the capital flows management
policy. From 2003 to 2007, a period of capital liberalization, the proxy average is 0,75, while
the average for 2009 to 2012, when capital market restrictions increased, is 0,61. Although the
difference is not major, this index seems to reflect the time variability of the policies, as the
average in the capital liberalization period is closer to 1.
In order to have a more detailed idea about the accuracy of the measure, we add vertical lines to
graph 6, illustrating the main discretionary policy measures regarding capital flows presented
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in Table 1. We get a reasonably good fit. Green vertical lines represent loosening capital
control measures, in most cases the implementation of the measure is followed by an upward
movement in the parameter in the next period or, at most, two periods ahead. This upward
movement means an approximation towards 1, the political stance with no capital controls.
Tightening measures are represented in red. In this case results are better, once the response
is more consistent. After the establishment of measure there is a downward movement of the
parameter, generally in the following period.
With these reasonable and consistent time-varying estimates we move to the next section, where
we compute the EMP measure.
4.2 EMP measure
Using the estimates of a1,t, b2,t and λt from the previous section, we can calculate the Exchange
Market Pressure, as defined in equation (11), with a time-varying coefficient conversion factor
that includes the capital control proxy. To illustrate the gains of such inclusion, we also show
the corresponding measure with no capital controls (as defined in equation (12)):
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Figure 7: EMP with time varying conversion factor, with and without capital controls.
Clearly the measures capture significant currency pressure. A comparison with the actual
contemporaneous exchange rate change picks up two major periods of policy intervention, aside
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from the crises periods. Between 2003 and 2007 the central bank actively and extensively used
reserves to prevent further appreciation of the currency (EMP is negative). Then, between 2009
and 2011, the CB acted again to prevent further appreciation of the currency in the response to
the huge capital inflows entering the Brazilian economy after the 2008 crisis. During this second
period the amount of reserves used was smaller. Finally, after 20011 most of the depreciation
pressure revealed by the EMP index is relieved directly by exchange rate changes, signalling
lower CB intervention as one would expect in a pure float exchange rate regime.
The encouraging results described so far show, however, very little relevance in the inclusion
of the capital control proxy. In reality, the two measures yield virtually the same results, with
the only exception being crises periods. The measure that includes the capital control proxy
picks up a slightly higher pressure (measure with capital controls is presented by the red line)
in those periods. These results are somehow expected once the capital control proxy is only
inflating or deflating the power of reserves in dampening exchange rate movements, as it enters
the model only as a component of the weighting factor. However, we could expect higher (more
significant) differences in the actual measure, if reserve movements were higher, or if the capital
control measures were more severe, creating a wider gap in the interest parity.
On the other hand, as the capital control measures were actively in place, it might be the case
that the actual change in reserves needed to attain a given exchange rate goal was influenced
by an inflated power of reserves in wedging of pressure, due to the presence of increasing capital
controls between 2009 and 2012. To assess such claim we can verify the time evolution of the
conversion factor itself (ωt):
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Figure 8: Conversion factor with and without capital controls.
We can see that the inclusion of a capital control proxy in the conversion factor inflates sub-
stantially the power of reserves in the EMP measure. Excluding the 2002 and the 2008 peak,
we see that the two conversion factors are closer between 2003 to 2007, than between 2009 and
2012. This is consistent with our previous claim. With more severe capital control measures we
could expect the gap between the conversion factors to widen and therefore a most significant
impact in the EMP measure.
Overall, it is plausible to conclude that policy-makers could see these results as indication
that capital controls may actually be an adequate policy measure to dampen some exchange
rate volatility, used in conjunction to changes in foreign reserves. We showed that capital
control restrictions may be an amplifying tool, increasing foreign reserves power and efficiency
for exchange rate management purposes. Naturally further study is encouraged to develop a
better understanding of which kinds of capital controls are more suitable to this effect, as well
as to understand the most adequate timings to implement them in order to magnify efficiency
of reserves. It would also be interesting to replicate the analysis in this framework to other
countries to verify the consistency of these results in other contexts.
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5 Conclusions
The definition of adequate monetary policies is a complex task, particularly in an open economy
set up. The impossible trinity states precisely that an independent monetary policy, open
capital markets and exchange rate stability can’t be attained simultaneously. This problem is
specially relevant for emerging countries, which are generally more affected by fluctuations in
the international economic environment.
In this context, emerging countries tend to defend their monetary policy autonomy by restricting
capital flows or inducing currency stability using intervention over the foreign exchange market.
Whenever central authorities maintain the currency artificially over or undervalued, a measure
of the actual pressure affecting the currency is needed. The Exchange Market Pressure Index
was first developed by Girton & Roper (1977) to this effect. In this work we focus on the role
of capital controls in inducing currency stability via the most typical policy intervention tool in
the forex marker, foreign reserves, and its adequate incorporation in an EMP measure.
The inclusion of capital controls in any numerical model is affected by a measurement problem:
with a very broad scope of policy instruments quantifying the overall restrictions in capital
mobility in a country is a very demanding process. We contribute to the literature by developing
an endogenous proxy of capital controls nested in simple small open economy model, applied
to the Brazilian economy.
Brazil encompasses several suitable characteristics that make it an interesting empirical applica-
tion for this work, we find out that between 2002 and 2014 it experienced a relative stabilization
of the exchange rate and we question if that stability was policy induced. In fact, Brazil in-
creased substantially its foreign reserve holdings after 2006 and capital openness decreased after
the 2008 crisis, as a response to the huge capital inflows from the developed world.
Using a time-varying coefficient method we estimate structural parameters for the Brazilian
economy, used to compute the EMP measure. We find out evidence of appreciation pressure
being wedged of in two different periods. First, between 2003 and 2007, in a context of a capital
liberalization process and second, between 2009 and 2012, in a context of increasing restriction
of capital mobility. This last period is particularly relevant due to the conjunction of direct
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intervention over the forex and the increase in capital controls. Although we don’t evaluate
capital controls effects directly over the exchange rate, we find evidence that they can amplify
the power of foreign reserve changes in relieving currency pressure.
Our results could be interesting to the policy-maker, as they suggest a broader framework to
monetary policy design. In fact, the adequate use of capital controls may ease forex intervention
and require fewer amount of reserves to attain a particular exchange rate goal. Naturally this
work is not a complete addition to the policy-maker information set, as further developments
could clarify relevant questions. Namely, which capital control policies work best for each
exchange rate goal. More detailed study about asymmetric effects might also be relevant: do
capital outflows or inflows restrictions have similar impacts? should the policy response differ
in appreciation and depreciation episodes? Empirical studies with higher frequency data could
also pinpoint other relevant details, like the most adequate timing to conjugate the two policy
instruments to attain the best possible outcome.
Naturally this study could be even more relevant for Brazilian policy-makers. In 2015 the
Brazilian economy started to plunge, as GDP declined, inflation rose and the exchange rate
depreciated fast. Soon policy-makers may actually be forced to intervene to avoid a major crisis
and they may wish to consider a forex policy intervention that requires fewer accumulation of
foreign reserves.
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Annexes
Annex 1 - Literature Review
After the initial definition and measure developed by Girton & Roper (1977), the literature
expanded essentially in two branches: computing the EMP measure in a model dependent
manner or in a model free way. There are some basic trade-offs between those two branches:
any measure that is model independent is easier to compute but might perform worst when
applied to specific country, on the other hand a model specific measure could be expected to be
more accurate when providing information about the pressure on a specific economy but it is
much harder to apply once generally structural parameters for the economy must be estimated
first. This work focuses on a model dependent measure but eventually some model dependent
measures are going to be calculated for comparative purposes. In what follows a brief detour of
the main works done in this subject are presented. To avoid a very extensive review, this section
discussion will include only the works that contributed the most to the theoretical debate about
the EMP determination, many other important works were developed, focusing specially on the
empirical applications of the measure. A list of these works is provided in the end of this section
and the respective references are included in the dedicated chapter.
The concept of EMP was first defined by Girton & Roper. Using a monetary model and the
asset market approach to exchange rate determination, the authors first derive the first model
dependent measure of EMP as:
EMPt = ∆et + ∆rt (13)
For Girton and Roper EMP was a measure of the intervention necessary to achieve a specified
exchange rate goal. To test their measure, the authors develop an empirical application for the
case of the post war Canadian dollar, calculating the EMP against the US dollar. Based on
the results, an appreciation of CB intervention was done and, more broadly, an evaluation of
monetary policy independence in the context of an open economy was performed.
In 1995, 1997 and 1998 Weymark develops a series of works with the goal of generalizing and
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clarifying the EMP concept and measure. In fact, it is Weymark who formally defines EMP
in a model independent fashion. Her definition departs in two ways of the one provided by
Girton and Roper. First, Weymark defines EMP as the excess demand for domestic currency
in international markets, rather than in domestic markets, which allows the concept to be
applied to monetary models of exchange rate determination as well as to other determination
approaches. Additionally, she clarifies that the measure of excess demand for currency must be
associated with the expectations about the exchange rate policy in place, rather than the one
obtained based on a comparison of the external imbalance that would have occurred with a free
floating exchange rate regime.
Based on this model independent definition, and using a small open economy monetary model
with rational expectations, Weymark suggests a measure for this index:
EMPt = ∆et + η∆rt (14)
where η = −∂∆rt/∂∆et, obtained from the exchange rate determination condition, is a model
specific conversion factor that allows the disparate units in which ∆et and ∆r
′
t are measured to
be combined. It’s actual value will depend on the model specification chosen. In the standard
small open economy model used by Weymark η = (a2 + b2)
−1, where a2 is the sensitivity of
domestic prices to changes in forex reserves and b2 is the semi-elasticity of the mony demand to
changes in the interest rates. With this definition the author derives a Central Bank intervention
index applied to the Canadian economy.
Another important work in this domain was one developed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
in 1995, in the context of currency crises analysis. ERW argue that EMP could be used as a
good index to evaluate the likelihood of a given economy being vulnerable to a currency crises,
once it informs about the under or over-evaluation of currencies following official intervention.
Stressing that most models of exchange rate determination perform poorly (specially in the
short and medium run), ERW develop a model independent measure of EMP:
EMPt = ∆et + ηr∆rt + ηi∆it (15)
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This index is model independent both in the variables included and on the weighting scheme used
so that all the components are expressed in comparable units. ERW choose to include a foreign
reserves component and an interest rate component in their measure based on the fact that these
are the instruments usually used by the central authority to influence the observed exchange
rate: changes in reserves work as a direct intervention mechanism, while changes in the policy
interest rate work as indirect intervention. This conclusion is based on the analysis of Central
Bank actions rather than on a monetary model. Recognizing that the unit of measurement of
changes in reserves and changes in interest rates may be substantially different than the units
in which changes in the exchange rate are measured, ERW propose a simple way of correcting
for these different dimensions: defining the weights as a ratio of standard deviations.
ηi =
std(∆it)
std(∆et)
ηr = −std(∆rt)
std(∆et)
(16)
With the weights set in this way, all the variables have the same conditional volatilities and
so they can be added up to form the measure. Note that the negative sign on the reserves
component is justified by the expected effect of changes in this variable: an increase in foreign
reserves means that the supply of domestic currency in foreign markets increases, which will
in principle increase the exchange rate, making domestic currency cheaper than it would be
without intervention which indicates that a downward Exchange market pressure is being done.
In 1999 Spolander developed a model dependent measure of EMP (and Central Bank interven-
tion) that reflects that most Central Bank interventions on the foreign exchange market are
sterilized via domestic market operations,so that they have no impact over the domestic money
market and the interest rate. The respective measure is given by:
EMPt = ∆et + η
d(1− ζ)∆rt (17)
where ηd is the negative of the elasticity of the change in the exchange rate with respect
to changes in the monetary base (which works as a structural parameter, depending on the
specifications of the economy being modelled) and ζ is an index of sterilization that reflects
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the portion of reserve changes that were actually sterilized. The author then performs an
empirical investigation about the Finnish economy calculating the degree of sterilisation of
official interventions and the EMP measure, as well as the respective intervention index.
Klassen and Jager (2011) further develop the literature by reckoning that generally policy
instruments are used for more than one goal and ideally any EMP measure should consider this
fact: not all changes in policy interest rates, for instance, are performed to affect the exchange
rate. In this sense the authors defend that there is a domestically desired set of variables
(called counterfactual variables) that would be set independently from any exchange rate goal.
Therefore only the gap between these theoretical domestically desired variables and the actual
variables should be included in the EMP measure:
EMPt = e
c
t − et−1 (18)
Which opposes to previous literature, that defined the pressure as resulting from wedges be-
tween current value and lagged value of the variables. Departing from a monetary model set
up, the authors proceed and provide an explicit EMP measure using a less demanding set of
assumptions25:
EMPt = ∆et + ηi(it − idt ) + ηc∆ct (19)
In this definition Klassen and Jager (2011) include both an interest rate component and a
reserves’ components: ct stands for the change in reserves scaled by the monetary base, while
the interest rates enter and as the gap between actual rate and the domestically desired rate
(that can be proxied by a simple Taylor rule, or by the policy interest rate of a reference
country like the US, whose monetary policy is believed to be independent). The weights of the
components in the measure, ηi and ηc are computed in the spirit of ERW, so that conditional
volatilities are equalized. The main difference in this measure is, however, the fact that interest
rates enter in levels: the authors defend that facing a currency pressure that must be wedged off
for several periods the Central Bank could raise the interest rate and keep it in that high level
25The authors argue that exchange rate determination models have poor predictive power, and therefore a
less demanding (opposed to one derived from a monetary model) measure is desirable, specially for empirical
applications.
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while the pressure is still perceived, in such case lagged changes of interest rate would reveal no
intervention (because there was no actual change across periods). By including the interest rate
in levels authors make sure that such kind of policy intervention is captured in the measure as
long as it occurs. Then, to empirically test the validity of their measure, Klassen and Jagger
apply their approach to the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of the European Monetary System
as well as to the Asian Crisis.
Aside from the works presented above, it is important to refer that other relevant empirical
investigations on EMP were performed: Connolly and Dantas da Silveira (1979) computed
EMP for Brazil; Modeste (1981) tested the EMP measure for Argentina; Kim (1985) adapted
the model to the South Korean reality; Pentecost et al (2001) estimated the EMP of German
Mark in five members of the European exchange rate mechanism; Stavarek (2007) computed
EMP for Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland; Macedo, Pereira and Reis (2008)
calculated the Exchange Market Pressure for five african countries members of CPLP26; Lopes
and Santos (2010) evaluated the financial credibility of West and South African Countries, Hall
et al. (2013) estimated the currency pressure for the UK, China and Japan and Franco, Delgado,
Monteiro& Silva (2015) estimated an EMP model for Angola.
26Community Portuguese-speaking Countries
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Annex 2 - Brazil and the Chinn-Ito Index.
A broader view about the stance of Brazil in terms of capital closedness (both across time and
relative to the other countries policies) can be illustrated by the Chinn-Ito Index, presented
below.
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Figure 9: Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index
As explained this index has, by construction, zero mean with higher values being associated with
higher financial openness and so fewer capital controls. Although this index is not subject to
direct incorporation in an EMP measure, it provides important information about the evolution
of capital control measures relative to the other countries in the sample.
The dark blue line reports the index for the US, the country with lowest level of capital controls
in comparative terms. The light blue line represents China, a country that extensively uses
capital controls (with an average index value of -1.33, across the sample).
Brazil’s results are shown by the red line. Across the sample Brazil has shown low financial
openness (the average performance is -1.20). Contrasting with a period of higher financial lib-
eralization, between 1998 and 2006, the following years evidence a tighter control over capital
flows. These figures are specially relevant when compared with the simple average of the AL-
ADI27 countries indices, excluding Cuba (for which data wasn’t available) and Brazil. These
countries show higher financial openness than Brazil (with a sample average of 0.31). Therefore,
even comparing with other Latin-American countries, Brazil relies heavily on capital controls.
27Latin-American Integration Association - Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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Annex 3 - Time-Variant response of CB to exchange rate changes
In the spirit of Hall et al. (2013), a measure of the degree of intervention in the forex market
can be derived from the response function of the Central. Condition (7) is the response function
of the Central Bank that relates the exchange rate changes with the changes in foreign reserves.
In this equation, ρ is the elasticity of exchange rate change with respect to changes in foreign
reserves. Hence it can be interpreted as the extension to which changes in reserves are used to
respond to changes in the exchange rate.
To estimate ρ we will use a five period centred moving average (with equal weighting scheme)
of the ratio of reserves and exchange rate changes, that is:
ρt ≈ −∆rt
∆et
The reason for the moving average is to filter any variations in external reserves related with
current transactions with the rest of the world. These changes are not targeting exchange rate
and should not be considered. The time variation of ρ is presented below:
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Figure 10: Elasticity of exchange rate changes to changes in foreign reserves.
Until 2011 reserves were highly sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. This is the period of
the managed float, where Brazil extensively used reserves to dampen exchange rate fluctuations.
The end of the sample ρ becomes negative meaning that reserve changes were not associated with
exchange rate changes, which is consistent with the float exchange rate regime classification.
Both observations are consistent with the results presented so far.
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Annex 4 - Variables and TVC estimation description
Interest Condition Estimation
Equations:
Signal :
intgapt = λ0,t + λ1,texgap+ vt
States :
λ0,t = α0,0 + α0,1lnebmit + α0,2lninprodbzt−1 + α0,3infbzt + ε0,t
λ1,t = α1,0 + α1,1exgapt + α1,2infbzt−1 + α1,3ttradet + α1,4∆lngdprbzsa+ ε1,t
Estimation results:
Sspace:	CCONTROL
Method:	ML	(Marquardt)
Sample:	2002Q1	2014Q4
Included	observations:	52
Coefficient Std.	Error
alpha_0,0 -0,5503*** 0,1580
alpha_0,1 0,0520*** 0,0053
alpha_0,2 0,0693** 0,0306
alpha_0,3 0,9151*** 0,1669
alpha_1,0 0,61974*** 0,2018
alpha_1,1 4,0418* 2,1679
alpha_1,2 -9,7131*** 3,0113
alpha_1,3 0,6441*** 0,1709
alpha_1,4 -4,1732*** 1,8241
Final	State Root	MSE
lambda_0 0,1139*** 1,11E-02
lambda_1 -0,0396*** 0,0000
Table 5: Total Coefficients - UIP Condition
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Figure 11: Data used in Uncovered Interest Parity Estimation
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Figure 12: Coefficient Drivers used in Uncovered Interest Parity Estimation
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Money Demand Estimation
Equations:
Signal :
lnm2defsat = b0,t + b1,tlngdprbzsa+ b2,tmmratet + vt
States :
b0,t = α0,0 + α0,1mmrateust + α0,2lnebmit + ε0,t
b1,t = α1,0 + α1,1lngdprbzsat + α1,2infbzt + ε1,t
b2,t = α2,0 + α2,1mmratet + α2,2infbzt−1 + α2,3ttratet + ε2,t
Estimation results:
Sspace:	MONEY
Method:	ML	(Marquardt)
Sample:	2002Q1	2014Q4
Included	observations:	52
Coefficient Std.	Error
alpha_0,0 3,2711 3,4036
alpha_0,1 -4,2174*** 1,0372
alpha_0,2 0,1627** 0,0657
alpha_1,0 0,3045 0,2229
alpha_1,1 0,0165*** 0,0041
alpha_1,2 0,1347** 0,0568
alpha_2,0 -2,2300 1,8026
alpha_2,1 7,6752 7,2084
alpha_2,2 -1,9523*** 0,7391
alpha_2,3 -21,11989*** 5,8096
Final	State Root	MSE
b_0 4,040282*** 0,0000
b_1 0,733562*** 0,0021
b_2 -2,487271*** 0,0984
Table 6: Total Coefficients - Money Demand Condition
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Figure 13: Data used in Money Demand Estimation
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Figure 14: Coefficient Drivers used in Money Demand Estimation
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Pricing Condition Estimation
Equations:
Signal :
pricegapt = a0,t + a1,texrate+ vt
States :
a0,t = α0,0 + α0,1mmratet + α0,2lnm2defsat + α0,3lnebmit + ε0,t
a1,t = α1,0 + α1,1lnexratet + α1,2lnvexpbzt + α1,3lnebmit + ε1,t
Estimation results:
Sspace:	PRICING
Method:	ML	(Marquardt)
Sample:	2002Q1	2014Q4
Included	observations:	52
Coefficient Std.	Error
alpha_0,0 -7,1806*** 0,2864
alpha_0,1 0,3985*** 0,1085
alpha_0,2 0,2941*** 0,0121
alpha_0,3 0,0823*** 0,0182
alpha_1,0 0,5301*** 0,1310
alpha_1,1 0,5996*** 0,0336
alpha_1,2 0,0628*** 0,0173
alpha_1,3 -0,2060*** 0,0181
Final	State Root	MSE
a_0 -0,0393*** 7,79E-03
a_1 0,2504*** 0,0111
Table 7: Total Coefficients - Pricing Condition
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Figure 15: Data used in Price Condition Estimation
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Figure 16: Coefficient Drivers used in Price Condition Estimation
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